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PIZZA-BOX CONTRACTS: TRUE TALES OF CONSUMER
CONTRACTING CULTURE
Amy J. Schmitz*
"The computer industry and other courts have adopted the term 'pizza
box' to describe the package in which the document containing the terms
and conditions of the agreement is shipped. As a matter of law in the
State of New York, such a container is not a 'pizza box.' No self
respecting New York pizza would be caught soggy in such a box. The
container may pass as a 'pizza box' in those parts of the world that think
food from Domino's, Little Caesar's, Pizza Hut, and Papa John's is
pizza. In this Court's opinion such a classification cannot be recognized
east of the Hudson River."'
INTRODUCTION
Do you ask for contract or purchase terms prior to completing
your everyday purchases? Typical consumers do not ask for or read
their contracts pre-purchase, and companies have become
accustomed to burying purchase terms in product packaging or
Internet links. These post-purchase, rolling, or "pizza-box" contracts
have therefore become the norm in the consumer marketplace, and
courts generally enforce them as legitimate contracts although they
may leave consumers feeling soggy.2 Courts reason that access to
terms equates assent under current contract law and prevailing
notions of contractual liberty.
The Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. opinion set the stage for this
reasoning.3  The court emphasized the efficiency of such form
* Amy J. Schmitz, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado
School of Law. I thank Larry DiMatteo, Dean Blake Morant, and the Wake
Forest Law Review for organizing this engaging symposium, and all the
symposium participants for their insights and comments. I also thank Stefanie
Mann and Jeffrey Boman for their research assistance.
1. Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 391 (Civ. Ct. 2001).
2. See James J. White, Warranties in the Box, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 733,
747-52 (2009) (characterizing the rolling contract as "a solution disfigured with
ugly warts").
3. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997)
(enforcing a form computer purchase contract requiring arbitration). But see
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-75 (App. Div. 1998)
(enforcing the identical Gateway arbitration clause, but vacating the portion of
the clause requiring arbitration before a tribunal that may be excessively
costly).
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contracting in enforcing an arbitration provision buried in the
packaging that came with the computer the Hills had purchased
over the phone.' The court concluded that the Hills assented to the
provision by not returning the computer within thirty days as
permitted by the approve-or-return proviso in other packaged
terms.5 The court gave little thought to psychological barriers,
shipping costs, and other burdens of product returns. It indicated
no sympathy for consumers who fail to read and take action with
respect to form terms ex ante.
Many courts routinely apply this efficiency-focused and
formulaic analysis to enforce consumer contracts despite their
nonnegotiable nature.! They often justify this strict enforcement as
proper under classical contract principles and necessary to the
vitality of an efficient market economy.9 Many economists also
assume that form contracts foster convenience and cost-savings that
corporations may pass on to consumers through lower prices and
better quality goods and services.'o Theorists further reason that
consumers remain free to reject form contracts and bear
responsibility for their failures to shop for or negotiate beneficial
contracts. "
Strict enforcement of post-purchase or pizza-box contracts
nonetheless raises textured consideration of consumers' love/hate
relationship with form terms. On the one hand, consumers admit
4. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
5. Id. at 1150-51. The Court also rejected the Hills' claims that the
arbitration clause was invalid regardless of its nonconsensual nature because it
precluded class relief, curtailed their right to recover attorney fees under the
Magnusson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), and required them to arbitrate
their claims in a potentially expensive forum. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-
09 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that an employee assented to an arbitration clause
an employer imposed after hiring the employee because the employee could opt
out within thirty days). Companies now go further by requiring consumers to
revisit companies' "terms and conditions" on their websites to learn of contract
changes and additions that consumers are deemed to accept by continuing to
use a company's products or services. See, e.g., Meetup Terms of Service
Agreement, http://www.meetup.com/terms (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
8. See generally MORTON J. HORwiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860, at 160-73 (1977).
9. See id. at 161.
10. See e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435-51 (2002)
(explaining why electronic contracts are not adhesive per se under contract law,
and discussing the efficiency benefits of standard form contracts).
11. See id. at 437, 441; see also Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-50 (finding assent to
a form arbitration clause). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and
Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent,
62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1382-86 (1996) (critiquing the courts for "drifting away




that they have no interest in reading form contracts, enjoy the
convenience and efficiency of form contracting, and routinely accept
forms "dressed up" as deals without stopping to read or question
their content. On the other hand, consumers are often frustrated
with the effectively nonnegotiable nature of these contracts and
complain that they lack the requisite time or understanding to read
or negotiate companies' impenetrable purchase terms. Consumers
then use this frustration to justify their lack of contract vigilance,
which, in turn, gives companies more leeway in crafting contracts to
their advantage. Some companies misuse this power to impose
unfair contracts, but consumers also bear some responsibility for
allowing companies to run roughshod over their rights.
These contracting dynamics lie at the heart of what I have
termed the consumer "contracting culture."12 This conception of
culture encompasses economic and noneconomic factors that impact
parties' contracts, and goes beyond common notions of "culture"
focused on ethnicity, nationality, or religion. 3 I also have proposed
a continuum analysis of contracting cultures ranging from "intra
communal" to "extra communal" based on parties' relations,
understandings, and values." I placed consumer form contracting
toward the extra communal end of this continuum due to consumers'
lack of connections or shared interests with companies that employ
adhesive terms." I contrasted this with more intra communal
commercial construction contracting to the extent these parties
often share interests and industry understandings.'6
This characterization sought to highlight how form contracts'
legitimacy and practical import differ in contrasting contracting
cultures." This view of consumer contracting also relied largely on
theory and intuition suggesting that most consumers lack
bargaining power and have little choice but to accept companies'
form contracts."' However, all consumers are not the same, and
empirical support is vital to any conception of contracting behavior.
Some have used this to critique consumer legislation such as the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
12. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in
Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 123 (2007).
13. Id. at 145; see also Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, Culture,
Negotiation, and the Eye of the Beholder, 7 NEGOT. J. 249, 250-53 (1991)
(highlighting the importance of considering cultural differences relating to
ethnicity or nationality and recognizing similar differences due to race, gender,
and age).
14. See Schmitz, supra note 12, at 145.
15. Id. at 159-60.
16. Id. at 158. I distinguish commercial from residential construction due
to the differing bargaining and relational contexts involved and recognize also
that any categorical assumptions regarding contracting behaviors are subject to
exceptions.
17. See id. at 162-72.
18. See id. at 160.
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("Dodd-Frank Act"), which calls for a wide array of consumer
financial regulations." That is not to say all theory, or the Dodd-
Frank Act are faulty, but instead recognizes a need for empirical
research to test these ideas and perhaps provide them with more
power and legitimacy.
Accordingly, my research, since introducing my notion of
consumer contracting culture, has expanded to consider others'
empirical studies, as well as my own, of the process and product
with respect to consumer form contracts. Although contract
research traditionally has focused on doctrine, it increasingly has
encompassed psychological, behavioral, and other empirical
dimensions of contracting. This Article will present a picture of
such research and introduce some relevant findings from my own
focus group and e-survey research. Although this introduction will
not be comprehensive, it aims to emphasize the need for textured
research in designing policies that address the complexities of
consumer contracting culture.
Part I of this Article will provide a brief background of the
varying theoretical perspectives on post-purchase consent. Part II
will then explore the available empirical data relative to whether
and when consumers read contract terms and the extent it truly
matters or necessarily results in unfair or one-sided terms. Part III
will add some relevant results from the recent e-survey I conducted
of consumers' contracting behavior, and Part IV will conclude by
inviting further study and debate regarding enforcement of post-
purchase terms. Further study and consideration is especially
important in light of the increasing prevalence of these terms with
respect to online/e-contracts.
I. LEGAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON POST-PURCHASE
CONSENT
"Shrink-wrap" and "click-wrap" contract terms have become the
norm for consumer purchases. 20 This rise has been fueled in part by
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009) (bill that is now the Dodd-
Frank Act, establishing an agency to regulate consumer financial products and
services and authorizing the agency to approve pilot programs for effective
disclosure of consumer contract terms); David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright,
How the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 Would Change the
Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial Products 3-8 (George Mason Univ.
L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-51, 2009), available at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working-papers/095lHowtheC
FPAAct.pdf (questioning the lack of evidentiary basis for the law's broad scope
prior to its enactment when it was called the "Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act").
20. See Jonathan D. Robbins, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Contracts,
ADVISING EBUSINESSES § 3:50 (2008).
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formalistic enforcement of these contracts as necessary to promote
market efficiency.2 1 It also has gathered steam from contract law
and scholarship denouncing courts' so-called "paternalistic" policing
of contracts through use of equitable defenses such as
unconscionability.22 Nonetheless, some courts have resisted
presumptive enforcement of post-purchase terms based on lack of
assent and unconscionability and behavioral theorists have added
support for this resistance based on relational and behavioral
research.
A. Classical and Formalistic Perspectives
Classical contract doctrine posits strict contract enforcement
and formulaic rules as means for incentivizing individuals to read
their contracts and responsibly protect their economic interests. 23 It
further seeks to foster certainty and promote both the parties' long-
term interests and optimal overall distribution of resources.2 The
doctrine assumes that buyers and sellers make rational contracting
choices that will lead to inclusion of efficient and interest-
251
maximizing terms. Furthermore, it presupposes healthy
competition among reputation-concerned sellers.26
Classical and economics commentators who focus on efficiency
worry that legislative regulation produces negative consequences for
consumers and the overall economy." They warn that courts'
21. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1697, 1721-25 (1996) (arguing that incorporation of unwritten norms in
contracts may foster suboptimal or inefficient results); Robert E. Scott, The
Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 859-61 (2000)
(arguing that formalistic contract analysis and enforcement better maximizes
parties' value than more flexible relational methodology).
22. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir.
2002) (enforcing a nonnegotiable arbitration provision in an employment
agreement); Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1986)
(urging courts to refrain from infringing contract freedom).
23. See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License To Deceive:
Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 617, 619-23 (2000) (discussing courts' strict enforcement of
form contracts when rejecting fraud challenges of contracts containing
disclaimer clauses).
24. See Brian Bix, Epstein, Craswell, Economics, Unconscionability, and
Morality, 19 QuINNIPIAC L. REV. 715, 717 (2000) (noting law and economics
theorists' suggestion that presumed enforcement of adhesion contracts may be
in "the long-term interests of those who sign" them).
25. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net
Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 97 (2006).
26. See id. at 90-94 (discussing formalistic application of contract
defenses).
27. See Bix, supra note 24, at 720-21 (proposing that contracts scholars fail
to "digOl down as deep as one might into the moral question: why, or under what
circumstances, should 'consent' justify state enforcement of agreements?"); see
also Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
EcoN. 293, 293 (1975) (discussing strict enforcement under classical contract
2010]1 867
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unpredictable enforcement of contracts may cause merchants to
avoid transactions with those likely to challenge adhesion contracts
or to pass on contract litigation costs to consumers through
increased prices and decreased quality of goods and services.28
Furthermore, some scholars argue that strict enforcement of form
contracts benefits all consumers regardless of the contracts'
adhesive nature because standardization lowers transaction costs
and fosters production.29
This perspective fueled the Hill court's refusal to consider
substantively the potentially high costs of arbitration to the
consumer under the terms in Gateway's computer packaging.o
Similarly, another court recently enforced new credit card provisions
imposed on consumers if they wished to maintain their accounts.
It reasoned:
These sorts of take-it-or-leave-it agreements between
businesses and consumers are used all the time in today's
business world. If they were all deemed to be unconscionable
and unenforceable contracts of adhesion, or if individual
negotiation were required to make them enforceable, much of
commerce would screech to a halt. 32
Courts have used this reasoning to support their enforcement of
arbitration clauses coupled with an opt-out provision. This
reasoning also has resonated with courts that have enforced post-
purchase terms consumers must accept if they want to keep their
cell phone service,34 and software license terms contained inside
doctrine); Peter Huber, Flypaper Contracts and the Genesis of Modern Tort, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 2263, 2268-69 (1989) (highlighting how classical contract law
can "operate very harshly").
28. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 10, at 440-41.
29. See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMoRY L.J. 1401, 1403-04, 1433-51
(2009) (arguing that consumers prefer standardized contracts over spending
time negotiating individualized terms, and that standardization allows for
innovation through segmented consideration).
30. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997)
(giving little thought to shipping costs and other burdens of requiring the Hills
to return the computer in order to reject boxed terms).
31. Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 555-57 (8th Cir. 2009).
32. Id. at 555 (reversing the district court's finding that the new arbitration
terms were unconscionable). Thus, the Court enforced the terms although they
were in "fine print" and precluded the consumers from pursuing a class action
on their unfair credit practices claims against Chase. Id.
33. See, e.g., Clerk v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 09-05117, 2010 WL
364450, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010) (holding a thirty-day opt-out provision
precluded consumers from showing an arbitration provision was procedurally
unconscionable); Martin v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., No. 08-3322, 2008 WL
4443021, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2008) (finding an arbitration clause valid
because it included a fifteen-day opt-out provision).
34. Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (S.D.
868 [Vol. 45
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software packaging or splashed on the computer screen when a user
downloads the software." Furthermore, courts focused on efficiency
have eased notice requirements for e-contract terms, thereby
requiring consumers to be more vigilant in reading terms regardless
of whether they appear above an "I accept" button or are only
accessible via a link at the bottom of a computer screen." Courts
also have expanded this duty of vigilance to require consumers to
frequently check a company's website for new terms pursuant to a
modification clause.
At the same time, courts have enforced these after-the-fact
contract terms in employment contexts. For example, the court in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd rejected an employee's claim that he
did not assent to a one-sided arbitration clause that his employer
added to his form employment contract after he was hired." The
court found that Najd assented by not objecting to the clause within
thirty days as was permitted by the clause's opt-out provision.39 It
did not matter to the court that Najd's English proficiency was
limited and he did not notice the arbitration clause.40 Instead, the
court seemed to embrace ex post terms as an efficient and inevitable
aspect of consumer contracting.4 It focused on form over substance
Ill. 2005) (granting the cell phone provider's motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to a clause added to the consumer's contract, thereby precluding the
consumer's right to join any class action).
35. See, e.g., Microstar v. Formgen, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D. Cal. 1996),
rev'd on other grounds, 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding terms contained
in computer game packaging were binding); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.,
732 A.2d 528, 529-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (holding forum selection
clause in Microsoft Network's membership agreement enforceable where users
had the opportunity to scroll through the terms before clicking "I agree" to
complete registration).
36. See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237-38 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (holding a forum selection clause in a reasonably presented click-wrap
contract enforceable despite consumer's stated failure to read the contract);
Hotels.com v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 156-57 (Tex. App. 2006) (finding that
some potential claimants in a class action would be subject to an arbitration
clause in the relevant e-contract although they did not have to actually open
and view the terms before accepting the contract); Burcham v. Expedia, Inc.,
No. 4:07CV1963 CDP, 2009 WL 586513, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009)
(holding e-contract terms accessible via a link appearing at the bottom of
Expedia's webpage enforceable against a consumer who claimed he did not
realize he created an account).
37. See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds II, Electronic
Contracting Cases 2008-2009, 65 Bus. LAw. 317, 318-19 (2009) (citing Margae,
Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, No. 2:07-CV-916 TC, 2008 WL 2465450, at *2
(D. Utah June 16, 2008) (holding terms posted per a modification clause
enforceable against a sophisticated business contractor, but also noting other
cases refusing to enforce such modifications against consumers)).
38. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F,3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002).
39. Id.
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in relying on the opt-out provision as ostensible notice of the added
arbitration clause.42
B. Relational and Behavioral Views
Formalistic and classical contract approaches have not had free
reign. Relational and behavioral theorists have highlighted context
and relational dynamics in questioning formalistic notions of
consent, especially with respect to long-term and intra-industry
transactions.4 3  This has led some courts and commentators to
question the legitimacy of take-it-or-leave-it and post-purchase
contracts companies routinely employ in the consumer marketplace.
They worry that companies use these contracts to harness their
monopoly power and impose unfair or one-sided terms on
44
consumers.
For example, some courts have refused to enforce the Gateway
arbitration terms upheld in Hill based on their findings that these
terms were unconscionable or constituted proposals for modification
the consumers were free to reject. 5 Courts also have found that
post-purchase terms cannot be enforced in the absence of express
agreement or without reasonable notice.46 Some also have refused
to enforce post-purchase modifications to consumer contracts under
42. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 23, at 617-28, 700-06 (discussing
difficulty of balancing need to promote certainty by enforcing contract terms
against goals of deterring companies' fraudulent practices, and study findings
confirming low percentages of consumers who read contract terms); see also
generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1003 (2010) (highlighting contract law's failure to account for the
psychological dimensions of breach).
43. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (exploring the use of a private legal system in the
cotton industry); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AMER. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (studying contextual relations
in commercial exchanges); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978) (discussing the relational nature of long-term
contracts).
44. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMics 302 (5th ed.
2008).
45. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1138-42 (D.
Kan. 2000) (holding shrink-wrap terms were rejected proposals); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding
consumers subject to terms in the box but severing the unconscionable
arbitration clause).
46. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that a buyer could not be subject to shrink-wrap terms on a
software box he received after purchasing the software over the telephone);
Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 21-25 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding
arbitration terms in an e-contract unenforceable because they were presented
below the "I accept" button and therefore a reasonably prudent Internet user
would not notice the terms).
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terms giving the company free rein in changing the contract at any
*47time.
Similarly, some courts have highlighted relational dynamics in
determining e-contract enforcement. In Register.com., Inc. v. Verio,
Inc., for example, the court highlighted Verio's repeated use of
Register.com's computer processes and domain name registrant data
services in enforcing Register.com's post-purchase provision of terms
restricting use of its data for mail, e-mail, and telephone
solicitations.4 ' The court recognized that Verio may not have been
bound by the terms if it was a first-time or sporadic user of
Register's website. 49  However, Verio submitted queries to the
database daily and was thus akin to a grifter who continually takes
apples freely from a roadside fruit stand despite its exit sign
alerting takers that apples cost fifty cents each.50
The research by behavioral and cognitive theorists also has
illuminated individuals' propensity to assess improperly the
importance of contract terms.5 They note that individuals'
hindsight and outcome biases cause them to ignore long and
complex form provisions.52 Furthermore, contracting inertia causes
individuals to accept preprinted terms even if the terms defy
industry practice or legal defaults." Individuals also may fail to
seek contract changes due to fear such requests will backfire or
"rock the boat."54 Individuals' rationality is therefore "bounded" to
47. See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 37, at 318-20 (discussing e-
contract cases).
48. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401-02 (2d Cir. 2004).
49. Id. at 401.
50. Id. The court also rejected Verio's claim that it was not bound by the
restrictive terms because they were not accompanied by an electronic button
stating "I agree." Id. at 403-04.
51. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 307-22 (2006)
(discussing cognitive biases generally); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203,
1204-06, 1222-25, 1243-44 (2003) (discussing law-and-economics' assumptions
regarding consumer rationality and proposing that "buyers are boundedly
rational rather than fully rational decisionmakers" and, therefore, market
forces often will lead to inefficient terms in sellers' form contracts).
52. Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 122-25 (2007) (explaining behavioral law and
economics basics); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract
Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1607-09, 1627 (1998) (noting individuals' "tunnel vision" is
skewed by their biases). But see RICHARD A POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL
THEORY 264-65 (2001) (critiquing behavioral law-and-economic assumptions as
merely a psychological and sociological account of human behavior that
confuses explanation and prediction and lacks "theoretical ambition").
53. See Korobkin, supra note 51, at 1626-27 (advancing the "inertia theory"
that parties prefer default contract provisions).
54. See id. (explaining how negotiators may avoid potentially deal-breaking
departures from status quo contract terms); Macaulay, supra note 43, at 60-64
2010] 871
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the extent they do not properly assess contracts to protect their
long-term economic interests.""
Psychological and social theories also suggest that consumers
acquiesce in a low power status that hinders their insistence on fair
treatment.5 6  Sellers then may use their power to capitalize on
consumers' overconfidence regarding their purchases and failures to
properly weigh and consider contract risks and information." In
addition, theorists propose that individuals may fall prey to
psychological and behavioral patterns such as sunk cost effect,
cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias, and low-ball techniques."
Some scholars and policymakers accordingly argue that
consumer protection legislation is necessary to account for these
cognitive errors and contracting patterns, especially when coupled
with some companies' irreverence for trade and fairness norms."
For example, one scholar has proposed an independent mechanism
for reviewing and approving standard form contracts similar to
current website certification and Housekeeping Institute seal
("Detailed negotiated contracts can get in the way of creating good exchange
relationships between business units.").
55. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-80, 1546-47
(1998) (also indicating hope that economists and lawyers would incorporate
empirical findings into their assumptions). But see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law
and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law
and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72-74, 125-32 (2002)
(critiquing behavioral law-and-economics' view as based on only limited
empirical research and failing to precisely apply data to account for variation
among decision makers).
56. See Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form
Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 1, 29-33 (2002).
57. See Becher, supra note 52, at 136-77 (noting consumers' failure to
properly assess low-probability risks, recent versus future incidents, and
information buried in impenetrable forms).
58. Full discussion of these patterns is beyond the scope of this Article, but
I invite you to see Becher, supra note 52, at 124-35, for further explanation of
these various patterns.
59. See Shmuel I. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism:
Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 747, 750-55, 800-04 (2009) (proposing reforms); Jolls et al., supra
note 55, at 1510-15 (discussing behavioral law and economics theory with
respect to lending laws); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract
Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1263, 1325-26 (1993) (calling on courts to consider "what the consumer actually
knew" or should have known in assessing enforcement of form contracts); Todd
D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1173, 1231-43 (1983) (rejecting the general rule that contracts of adhesion are
presumptively enforceable); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 566 (1971)
(proposing that adhesion contracts can only gain legitimacy if they conform to
higher public laws and standards).
872 [Vol. 45
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programs.o Furthermore, the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act
provides for sweeping measures aimed to combat unfair consumer
contracts.6 1 Meanwhile, other countries impose stiff criminal
penalties on companies that use form consumer contracts containing
terms that do not meet professional diligence standards and may
distort economic behavior.6 2
II. EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS ON CONSUMER CONTRACTING
As noted above, I first introduced my "contracting culture"
conception without full exploration of empirical data. I had
considered limited data regarding arbitration clauses in order to
contrast parties' different degrees of shared or disjointed interests
and understandings in varied exchange contexts.63 However, this
Article goes further to provide a synopsis of the bargaining process
and product research as it relates to questions regarding pizza-box,
or post-purchase, contracts. This research sheds light on realities
and complexities policymakers should consider in designing
consumer protection legislation that addresses consumer and
marketplace needs.
A. Process: Exchange Behavior Studies
The available research has generally confirmed reports that
consumers do not read or "shop" for contract terms.64 In Professor
Hillman's survey of 92 law students, only 4% of respondents
60. Becher, supra note 59, at 750-55, 800-04 (advancing central clearing
house); see also Robert A. Hillman, On-line Consumer Standard-Form
Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications 1-30
(Cornell Law Sch., Legal Research Paper Series No. 05-12, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=686817 (proposing requirements that e-businesses
make terms available on their websites and follow substantive mandatory rules
for forum selection and choice of law provisions).
61. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 2010 Stat.
62. See Rebecca de Lorenzo, On Good Terms, 153 SOLICITORS J. 16, 16 (2009)
(discussing the United Kingdom's Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Regulations 1999, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997, and Consumer Protection
from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, and how they may impose criminal
sanctions for unfair consumer contracts).
63. Despite emerging research, there is still a need for more empirical
studies exploring consumer attitudes and behavior with respect to form
contracts. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website
Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire? 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840-43, 841 &
n.24 (2006) [hereinafter Boilerplate]; see also Sumit Agarwal et al., Do
Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts? (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.,
Working Paper No. 2006-11, 2006), available at
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-souleles/research/papers/ContractChoice_12
07s.pdf (reporting on a large U.S. bank's experiment comparing consumer credit
card choices with respect to no annual fee and higher interest rate versus
annual fee and lower interest rates when consumers do or do not carry
balances).
64. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 10, at 446-85.
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reported that they read their online contracts "as a general
matter."" Forty-four percent reported that they usually do not read
terms beyond price and product description, while 17% said that
they read only key terms such as warranties, product information,
disclosures, and warnings for purchases. 6 Students reported not
reading contracts due to being "in a hurry" (65%), believing nothing
will go wrong (42%), lacking contract diversity (42%), assuming fair
terms (32%), and believing law will cure unfairness (26%).67 Only
7% indicated that they compare terms beyond price and product
description, despite the arguable ease of "shopping around" via the
Internet.68
In a more recent laboratory-based study, researchers Debra
Stark and Jessica Choplin tested whether university students
required to participate in an experiment as part of a class would
read a purported consent form prior to signing it. They found that
95.6% of study participants signed the form without reading even
when it contained outrageous terms that differed from what the
researcher had orally promised. When the researcher asked the
participants why they did not read the form, "participants rated
themselves in highest agreement with the statement that they. . .
trusted what the researcher had told them," and, secondly, that they
trusted the university had complied with protective regulations.70
This is not a surprising reaction for students in a university
setting, but nonetheless adds evidence for the human propensity to
be overly optimistic and trusting with respect to purchases. The
results also call into question the efficacy of disclosures to the extent
participants generally agreed with statements that they did not
read the form because it was long, it was boring, they were lazy, and
they assumed the form was unimportant or would replicate others
they had read. Nonetheless, the results did not support
assumptions that individuals do not read forms due to fear they will
not be able to understand or negotiate them or want to protect their
reputations as good and trustworthy.7
Stark and Choplin then followed the lab experiment with a
survey of law students and individuals approached in public
65. Hillman, supra note 60, at 1-30 (survey asking students thirty
questions, including three questions about gender, marital status, and age).
66. Id. at 6-10 (also finding that thirty-six of the fourty non-readers said
they would not read under any circumstances, although one-third stated that
they are more likely to read e-contracts for higher-value products or from
unknown vendors).
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Stark & Choplin, supra note 23, at 627, 677-83.
70. Id. at 684-85 (noting the problems inherent in asking individuals to
report and rate their own actions).
71. Id. at 685.
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places.72  Results from the ten-question survey confirmed that
individuals generally agree to contracts without reading them.73 Of
the public and student respondents that had rented cars, only 55.7%
of the public sample and 56.8% of the law students reported reading
rental agreement terms, and 48.6% of the public and 78.6% of the
students in the pool of readers said that they do not read all of the
terms." Similarly, 71.3% of the law students and 62.1% of the
public sample admitted that they do not read any of the terms
enclosed in packages with goods delivered to them post-purchase.
Although the reading rates were higher for home and lease
contracts, these percentages were still fairly small.7 6 In addition,
findings again highlighted contracting optimism in that respondents
generally said they do not read contracts because they expect
companies to "stand behind" their "verbal representations."
Becher and Unger-Aviram surveyed 147 consumers about their
expected behavior in scenarios dealing with car rental, checking
account, laundry services, and nursery school contracts. In an
initial survey, 81% of the respondents said they would not read the
car rental contracts, 92% reported that they would not read the
checking account contracts, and 75% expected that they would not
read the laundry services contracts.7 9 As may be expected in these
time-pressured or immediate-need contexts, respondents said they
would be more inclined to skim these contracts (60%, 47%, and 61%,
respectively) or read them later if they were to experience
problems.80  Furthermore, 76% reported that they would read
nursery school contracts, which is not surprising considering these
contracts would affect family members, involve more relational
negotiations, and likely provide more freedom of choice than the
other studied contexts."'
72. See id. at 677-78, 688-90 (noting that the 91 student participants were
fulfilling a course requirement, although they were offered other options for the
course requirement, and describing the later survey of 106 people approached in
a public location as well as 101 law students).
73. See id. at 691-99.
74. Id. at 692.
75. Id. at 692-93.
76. See id. at 694-96.
77. Id. at 694-97.
78. Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form
Contracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL
Bus. & COM. L.J. 199, 200-09 (2010). Notably, these surveys focused on how
consumers expected to act in the future per the presented scenarios and offered
only four or five responses, and did not ask about consumers' actual past
practices. My study includes these later questions.
79. Id. at 212.
80. Id. at 212-14.
81. Id. (also finding another 17% would skim the nursery school contract,
but concluding that the minority who reads contracts in their entirety in the
four scenarios as a whole would not rise to the one-third level theorists expect to
read and thus provides a policing mechanism contracts).
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These same scholars then surveyed 120 students regarding the
factors that influence whether they would read a car rental
contract.82 The survey respondents indicated that cost, contract
length, and opportunity to change terms would have the most
influence on their intent to read the contract ex ante.13 They also
said that these factors, along with opportunity to learn about the
transaction, would be most influential in their decision to read the
contract ex post.84 Contrary to what some have assumed, however,
respondents ranked contract density and font size as the least
influential on their intent to read the contract ex ante or ex post.85
Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen studied consumers'
Internet browsing behavior with respect to sixty-six online software
companies to explore what influences consumers to access the
associated standard form contracts, called end-user software license
agreements ("EULAs")." The researchers found that roughly one or
two in one thousand shoppers accessed software EULAs for at least
one second. This led them to question economists' assumption that
an informed minority of shoppers police fairness of contracts by
spreading information regarding corporate overreaching. 87 The
researchers nonetheless found that shoppers are more prone to
access EULAs of small companies or for "free" or otherwise suspect
products." They also found that older and higher-income consumers
are more likely to access EULAs."9
Eigen also studied online contracting behavior.90 He worked
with researchers in soliciting 1860 participants to take a survey
about work in exchange for a free DVD, and then assigned
participants to control groups with no contract or a contract coupled
82. Id. at 209-12. This questionnaire was very basic and answered only by
a fairly limited number of student volunteers.
83. Id. at 212-15.
84. Id.
85. Id. (also finding that respondents ranked contract length at the bottom
of their ex post importance scales, and proposing that empirical research is
necessary to enlighten consumer protection policy).
86. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to
Standard Form Contracts, (N.Y.U. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256
(studying the browsing of 45,091 households).
87. See id. at 1-4.
88. Id. at 3-5.
89. Id. at 34-37 (noting also their in-progress study indicating that
increased accessibility or disclosure would not cause more consumers to read
EULAs).
90. See Zev J. Eigen, Towards a Behavioral Theory of Contract:
Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise and Performance (2009
4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Working Paper, June 1,
2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1443549 (exploring interactions of




with different levels of assent to complete the survey.91 Researchers
found that nearly all participants sought to quit the required survey
before completion regardless of whether they signed a contract. 92
Participants were more likely to perform, however, when they saw
and actively selected contract terms.93 In addition, the amount and
conspicuousness of information provided upfront had an inverse
effect on the likelihood of reading fine print, thereby raising
questions regarding the efficacy of disclosure rules. Furthermore,
Eigen found that moral appeals had a more positive impact than
legal threats on participants' finishing the survey.94
Some researchers have focused on credit card contracts. For
example, a Visa-commissioned study generated findings suggesting
that consumers are careful to avoid annual fees on their credit
cards, and that the majority of those who do pay fees carry revolving
balances (presumably opting to pay a fee to receive a lower interest
rate).95  The study results also discounted earlier data indicating
that "teaser" introductory rates lure consumers to sign up for and
continue to use credit cards even after teaser rates expire." Other
research also has suggested that, on average, consumers generally
choose economically beneficial credit cards for their borrowing
practices and pay fairly small additional charges due to their
erroneous choices (i.e., fairly low annual fees).97
Nonetheless, scientific research has shown that individuals with
a specific gene engage in more impulsive, present-oriented, and
addictive behavior, and thus are more likely to incur credit card
91. Id. at 26-35 (providing a detailed description of the fairly complicated
research design).
92. Id. at 30-36 (finding also that participants reacted differently to
prompts they received that appealed to legal, moral, instrumental, or social
forces for finishing the survey).
93. Id. at 41-42.
94. Id. at 43-47 (concluding that contract promises creating obligations are
different from consent setting limits on rights foregone).
95. See Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So
Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 63-83 (2006) (discussing the Payment System
Panel Study).
96. Id. at 80 & fig.2, 81 & fig.3, 82-83 (indicating that consumers generally
do not fall prey to "teaser" rates and high-interest reward cards). Cf David B.
Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates
Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 149, 180 (2002) (finding consumers fail to use available funds in low-rate
checking accounts to pay off high-rate credit card debt); Haiyan Shui &
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market, 14th
Annual Utah Winter Fin. Conference (May 3, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622 (suggesting consumers are lured by "teaser"
rates).
97. Agarwal et al., supra note 63, at 15-17 (finding a majority of consumers
studied selected the economically beneficial credit card for their borrowing
practices, assessing "beneficial" in terms of a card with a higher interest rate
and no annual fee versus one with a lower rate but with a fee).
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debt." Research also has indicated that credit and banking markets
have not responded efficiently with respect to interest rates and
changes in the opportunity costs of capital.9 9 Credit card terms and
fees also have become increasingly onerous and consumer debt has
risen substantially during the current economic downturn.'00
This sampling of research provides mixed and uncertain
evidence regarding consumers' propensities to obtain, read,
negotiate, and otherwise act in "rational" ways with respect to their
contracts. However, it does suggest that consumers have become
accustomed to not reading contracts due to limited access, time, and
ability to negotiate contract terms. Consumers generally assume
that they lack power or contracting choices. Still, consumers may be
more vigilant with respect to higher cost purchases or what they
deem more important contracts or terms. For example, the
consumers studied above reported higher likelihood to read nursery
school contracts,o'0 presumably because they impact their children's
well-being and may involve significant costs. Overall, this research
shows that consumer contracting culture is more nuanced and
complex than most behavioral or economics models predict.
B. Product: Contract Term Studies
Other empirical studies of consumer contracts shed light on
whether contracting practices really matter with respect to the
contract terms they produce. For example, the study of EULAs
noted above included Professor Marotta-Wurgler's classification of
647 EULAs per what she labeled "pro-buyer" or "pro-seller"
provisions covering warranties, dispute resolution, liability limits,
and other common areas.' 0 2 Overall, the data indicated that
98. Jan-Emmanuel De Neve & James H. Fowler, The MAOA Gene Predicts
Credit Card Debt (Jan. 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457224 (using data from the National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent Health to show how the MAOA gene relates to impulsivity
and debt).
99. See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the
Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of
Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEx. L. REv. 1481 (2006) (discussing "sticky" interest rates
and their interaction with consumer behavior); Paul S. Calem & Loretta J.
Mester, Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit-Card Interest Rates, 85
AM. ECON. REV. 1327 (1995) (also finding sticky credit card rates); Ronald J.
Mann, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit, and Bankruptcy 30 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of
Law, Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 44, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=690701 (finding that
contrary to economic models, interest rates have fallen during periods of rising
credit card debt and bankruptcy filings).
100. Federal Reserve, Consumer Credit, http://www.federalreserve.gov
/releases/g19/current/g19.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
101. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 78, at 212-15.
102. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of
Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J.
EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447-50 (2008) [hereinafter Marotta-Wurgler,
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competition impacts price and other "salient aspects of product
quality" but has weak impact on boilerplate. 03  This led Marotta-
Wurgler to conclude that companies generally do not use their
higher market shares to impose more pro-seller fine print.o
In another study of these EULAs, Marotta-Wurgler explored
claims that "pay now, terms later" ("PNTL") contracts are more
onerous for buyers than those presented pre-purchase.'o' She
correlated the EULAs' classifications on her aforementioned pro-
buyer or pro-seller index with how accessible the EULAs were pre-
purchase, and found that the EULAs generally available pre-
purchase were more pro-seller than the PNTL EULAs.106 She also
found that the most pro-seller EULAs were those that buyers must
explicitly accept before completing a purchase.'07 She surmised that
companies may police their own PNTL contracts due to the
contracts' vulnerability to attack, thereby alleviating the need for
state regulation of PNTL contracts. 08 Nonetheless, this study only
focused on software EULAs, which likely involve Internet-savvy
consumers with more relevant experience and marketplace power
than in other consumer contracting contexts.
III. SNAPSHOT OF "CONSUMER CONTRACTING CULTURE"
Although interest in empirical contract research is growing,
many commentators and policymakers on all sides of consumer
protection debates continue to rely on old assumptions about
consumer contracts without consulting empirical evidence. This can
lead to shortsighted policies that do not truly respond to consumer
Competition]; see generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a Standard
Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J.
EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 677 (2007); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition
and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software
License Agreements (N.Y.U. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 05-11, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=799274 (creating
seven categories of standard terms and using a system of adding/subtracting
points depending on her assessment of terms as more "pro-buyer" or "pro-seller"
than the applicable UCC Article 2 default rules).
103. Marotta-Wurgler, Competition, supra note 102, at 451.
104. Id. at 475.
105. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts
Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL
STuD. 309, 309-12 (2009) (addressing efficiency versus fairness critiques of
PNTL contracts).
106. Id. at 315-20. After narrowing the sample to 515 of the EULAs, she
correlated their accessibility with a pro-seller or pro-buyer index falling into
seven categories: acceptance, scope, transfer, warranties and disclaimers,
limitations of liability, maintenance and support, and conflict resolution. Id. at
331-32.
107. Id. at 330-37 (indicating that courts' more stringent analysis of rolling
contracts helps stop sellers from using PNTL processes to impose unfair
contracts, at least with respect to software EULAs).
108. Id. at 336-37.
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and business needs, as some worry is true regarding the Dodd-
Frank Act. o0 Again, this does not necessarily mean that the Act or
other consumer protections are faulty. Indeed, consumer
protections can be very beneficial. However, it is important to go
beyond rhetoric to consider empirical evidence in crafting reforms.
My research regarding consumer contracting culture, therefore, has
included consideration of data from consumer focus groups, collected
common consumer contract terms, and an e-survey of Colorado
consumers. Below is a brief snapshot of this research as it pertains
to post-purchase contracts. n0
A. Qualitative and Focus Group Evidence
The stories are common: Consumers report how they often
cannot obtain contract terms even when they proactively request
them. For example, a consumer reported on a negotiation blog that
a Sprint representative replied "Huhhhhhhhhhh?????????" and
"Uhhhhhhhhhhhhhh-you mean the, uh, Plan Brochure?" when she
requested a copy of a Sprint phone service contract for review prior
to making purchasing decisions."' The consumer further relayed
that the Plan Brochure eventually provided failed to include all the
contract terms, which contained an arbitration clause requiring the
consumer to waive all access to court and any class action relief." 2
Similarly, my students and I had trouble gathering copies of
credit card contracts for a comparison study of the contracts'
arbitration terms."' We found that credit card companies usually
provide only basic interest rate and "special offer" or "bonus"
information on their websites and in mailed offers. They rarely will
provide consumers with copies of full contract terms and conditions
in advance of their becoming a customer, or at least applying for a
card.114 Nine of the largest credit card companies we called refused
109. See Evans & Wright, supra note 19, at 3-8.
110. More comprehensive explanation and analysis of the survey research
will be the focus of future papers.
111. Victoria Pynchon, The Fine Print: Sprint's Arbitration Clause, Settle It
Now Negotiation Blog, Consumer Contracts, http://www.negotiationlawblog.com
/2007/07/articles/arbitration/the-fine-print-sprints-arbitration-clause/ (July 7,
2007).
112. Id. (reporting that she read all the terms in the brochure and it said
"Nothing, Nada, Nichts" about arbitration but, in fact, the incorporated "Terms
and Conditions" buried on Sprint's website included the quite detailed and
onerous arbitration clause).
113. Collected Wireless Phone and Credit Card Arbitration Provisions (on
file with author) [hereinafter Collected Arbitration Provisions]; see also E-mail
from Derek Nelson White, University of Colorado Law Student, to author (Aug.
28, 2007) (on file with author) (reporting inability to obtain the terms applicable
to online purchases from customer service representatives who were surprised
and unprepared for such contract requests).
114. See E-mail from Aaron Clippinger, Research Assistant, to author (May
31, 2008) (on file with author) (Chase representative nonetheless suggesting
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to send us preapplication copies of their consumer credit card
contracts, and none of the twenty companies I wrote to complied
with my requests for advance copies of their contracts. 115
In addition, consumers in the three small focus groups I held in
Denver voiced dissatisfaction with companies' imposition of adhesive
contract terms. 1 6  Casual discussions with consumers who
volunteered to participate in these groups indicated a consumer
contracting culture devoid of substantive negotiation or assent. The
participants generally reported helplessness to the extent they
assume that they must accept form contracts in their everyday
purchases. 1 7  They also reported perceptions that it is a waste of
time to read or retain any copies of form contracts because they are
nonnegotiable."" The consumers therefore said they regularly
throw out mailings with modified terms, and bypass "terms and
conditions" links in contracts they enter into over the Internet."9
At the same time, consumers in the focus groups explained that
they usually prefer to discuss contract complaints with a company
representative, rather than through letters or formal complaint
processes.120 However, consumers also reported frustrations they
had experienced in seeking to discuss problems with company
representatives by telephone or e-mail.' 2' This was especially true
when purchasing goods or services via the Internet.122 They also
recounted instances in which company representatives told them
that they lacked power to change company terms. 123
Of course, this research is anecdotal and unscientific evidence
that the terms might be available to someone who has been pre-approved for a
credit card).
115. See, e.g., Letters from author to credit card companies and research
assistant chronicles (Feb. 6, 2008) (on file with author) (showing attempts to
obtain contracts).
116. See Consumer Focus Group Notes, conducted by author, Denver, Colo.,
Nov. 18, 2006 (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Consumer Focus Group]
(recording consumers' negative experiences and feelings of powerlessness with
companies that sell consumer goods and services). I recruited the consumers by
offering $25 to participate in the discussions in announcements placed in
newspapers and on Craigslist and other such online sources. All was done with
the approval of the University of Colorado Human Research Council ("HRC")
after my completion of the application and training processes.
117. See id.
118. Some of the consumers nonetheless reported a sense of freedom from
their ability to "shop around" even if they cannot effectuate changes in
companies' form contracts. One consumer explained her belief that "the nice
thing about competition is that if you don't like the contract you can just move
on." Id.
119. Id. (also reporting difficulties reaching company representatives to seek
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regarding consumer contracting, and involved a fairly small pool of
participants. It also is subject to perception and reporting biases, as
well as the bandwagon effect of group discussions. Reported
perceptions nonetheless matter and illuminate consumers' concerns.
Consumers who assume they lack contracting power lack incentive
to request or read pre-purchase copies of their contracts. With the
spread of these negative perceptions and feelings of helplessness, it
is hard to accept arguments that proactive consumers will
adequately police the fairness of companies' form contracts.
B. Survey Results
In order to go beyond stories and focus group discussions, I
designed and administered an e-survey over the Internet that
explored the processes, behaviors, and perceptions impacting
consumer form contracting. The e-survey aimed to provide a deeper
and more quantitative view of consumer contracting culture. 12 4 It
therefore explored consumers' attention to contract terms,
perceptions of common provisions, contract understandings, and
negotiation of form contracts applicable to typical consumer
purchases. This Article will provide a snapshot of survey findings
pertaining to questions related to post-purchase contracts.125
1. Research Design and Implementation
After extensive research, testing, and editing, a survey taking
roughly twenty minutes to complete was created, coded, and
administered with the assistance of the Institute for Behavioral
Science ("IBS") at the University of Colorado.126 It was sent over the
Internet to 1100 participants on Survey Sampling International's
("SSI") panel of Colorado consumers over 18 years old, producing a
research sample of 306 completed surveys from Colorado residents
ages 18-88.127 Roughly one-third of the respondents were male and
124. See Schmitz, supra note 12, at 123-27 (introducing this concept and
analysis).
125. Future reports and publications will discuss the broader data.
126. Survey Data (on file with author). Survey development included
extensive planning and design research, followed by editing and testing survey
drafts in order to cure ambiguities and errors. For example, I completed several
rounds of administering the survey to students, colleagues, and other
volunteers, gathered feedback, and edited accordingly. I thank Michelle Walker
for her assistance with this process.
127. Use of the SSI panel ensured confidentiality and full approval from the
Human Research Council at the University of Colorado. Using the SSI panel,
the survey first was sent between October 22 and 25, 2007 to 8000 Colorado
residents 8% of whom responded. The responses were then coded and
correlated with the demographic information SSI had previously gathered for
the respondents through their assigned identifying numbers or codes. We then
dropped from the sample all incomplete responses (i.e., the individual did not
complete all pages of the survey), were completed in six minutes or less (an
unreasonably short time for this survey), skipped many or essential questions,
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two-thirds were female; half were married; 7.5% lived with domestic
partners; and the remaining respondents were single, separated, or
widowed. 2 1
Three-quarters of the sample identified themselves as
Caucasian or white; 10% as African American or black, Hispanic or
Latino, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, or multiple races;
and the remaining respondents did not identify a racial category.129
Forty-three percent reported that they held bachelor's or
postgraduate degrees, 44% indicated some college but no degree,
and the rest said they had a high school diploma or less. 3 0 Forty-
two percent reported full-time employment, 16% reported part-time
jobs, and the rest reported no employment outside the home.''
Although the survey was carefully crafted and administered,
this type of survey research must be considered in light of
individuals' reporting and perception biases. Individuals are
inclined to report behavior they view as "good" or fiscally
responsible, and are prone to over optimism regarding their likely
behavior.132  This may lead consumers to indicate higher levels of
vigilance to contract terms and proactive contracting than they
pursue in reality. That said, this survey is different from many
discussed above in that participants were not students or required
to take the survey, and anonymously completed the survey in the
"flat-lined" responses, provided nonsensical answers, or otherwise "cheated" in
some way. We also sought to correct underrepresentation of younger men by
sending out between November 8 and November 13 an additional 2000
invitations to males 18-49 (from whom we received a response rate of 2.5%),
1000 reminders to previously invited males 18-29 (from whom we received a
response rate of 1.5%), and 1000 invitations to males 50+ (from which we
received a response rate of 14%). We again dropped apparent "cheaters" using
the same methodology we used for the first group of responses and sent out
additional reminders to males 18-45 in order to fill out a sample of 306
Colorado consumers that was fairly balanced with the Colorado census
information we obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. The process of
gathering and checking responses took over a month but allowed us to arrive at
what we believe is a solid sample.
128. Survey Data (on file with author). Women were much more receptive to
answering our survey. Also, roughly 51% were 40-59 years old, 14% were 30-
39, 16% were 60-69, 11% were under 30, and 7% were 70 or over.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Many did not identify themselves with respect to occupation. Of the
82% of those who reported income, roughly 30% made under $29,999; 30% made
$30,000-49,000; 19% made $50,000-$74,999; 9.6% made $75,000-$99,999; and
11.2% made over $100,000. Id.
132. See Thea F. van de Mortel, Faking It: Social Desirability Response Bias
in Self-Report Research, 25 AUSTL. J. ADVANCED NURSING 40, 40-48 (2008)
(discussing "social desirability response bias," which prompts survey
respondents to have a tendency to present a favorable image of themselves and
"may 'fake good' to conform to socially acceptable values, avoid criticism, or gain
social approval").
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comfort of their own homes and offices.133 This research, therefore,
adds to the empirical picture of consumer contracting.
2. Sampling of Relevant Survey Findings
Although the survey included a broad array of questions about
consumers' contracting practices and perceptions, several of the
survey questions were especially relevant to whether and when
consumers see or read form contracts. For example, the survey
asked respondents how they purchased their last electronic item.
Out of 306 respondents, 249 (81.4%) bought the last item at the
store, 42 (13.7%) bought over the Internet, and the rest chose "other"
or that they never purchased an electronic item.134 The store and
Internet purchasers were then directed to an appointed store or
Internet list using skip logic that funneled them to the appropriate
list per their responses to prior questions. They were then asked to
select all the ways they received purchase terms when making their
electronic item purchases. Accordingly, percentages for these
responses do not add up to 100%.
The consumers who stated that they last purchased an
electronic item at the store indicated as follows: 30.1%, "terms were
provided before [the consumer] purchased the item at the store";
30.9%, "terms were in the box or packaging with the item"; 19.3%,
"terms were on the bill or invoice for the item"; 37.8%, "terms were
explained to me by the salesperson at the store"; and 15.7%, "I did
not notice any terms at any point before or after purchase."'3 ' The
consumers who bought their last electronic item over the Internet
selected as follows: 23.8% "had to read or scroll through terms on
the computer screen and indicate that [they] accepted or agreed to
the terms" before purchasing the item; 9.5% were required to accept
"terms that were not on the computer screen but [they] could access
through a computer link"; 23.8% saw or could access terms but did
not have to indicate acceptance before making the purchase; 30.9%
either received terms on an invoice or in the packaging when the
item arrived; and 28.6% never noticed terms before or after
purchase.3 6
133. See supra notes 72-77 & 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing
other surveys involving students or respondents approached in public places).
134. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix B Section 2, Question 1 (backup on
file with author).
135. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix C Section 2, Question 1 (backup on
file with author). Respondents were given a list with these different ways of
receiving purchase terms and could choose all that applied, thus the
percentages do not add up to 100%. Nonetheless, a hand tally indicated that 56
of the in-store purchasers reported that they only received terms post-purchase
in product packaging or on the bill, and 37 did not notice any terms pre- or post-
purchase. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix C (backup on file with author).
136. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix D Section 2, Question 1 (backup on
file with author). 7.1% also indicated "other," and again because they could
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These results demonstrate the web of disjointed terms
consumers may receive at various points in the purchasing process.
They also support claims that consumers usually do not receive or
have to indicate acceptance to contract terms before paying for a
product.'3 7 This is especially true with respect to in-store purchases,
which is not surprising because it would be time consuming and
tedious to wade through fine print at the store checkout.1 3 1
However, a significant percentage of the respondents also indicated
that they discussed terms with a salesperson, although this likely
included only such terms as price or payment options and not the
fine print that usually comes in product packaging. '3 9 Furthermore,
only fourteen (33.3%) of the forty-two consumers who bought their
last electronic item over the Internet reported that they had to
indicate acceptance to the terms before making the purchase.140
Overall, 17.5% of the total store and Internet purchasers reported
never seeing any terms before or after completing their purchases.141
The next questions asked about the extent to which respondents
read or cared about any contract terms they received in conjunction
with their last electronic item purchases. Only 41.7% of
respondents said they read applicable terms before making their
purchases.'42 Furthermore, 52.1% of the respondents who read the
contract terms said that they did not consider any of the reviewed
terms important in deciding whether to complete their purchases.
This means that out of the 291 respondents who reported buying
electronic items, only 57 read purchase terms and thought they were
choose all that applied, the percentages do not add up to 100%.
137. Questions remain as to whether respondents who report that they did
not receive terms simply did not notice or recall receiving terms. Indeed,
companies may shroud terms while consumers often lack vigilance. Lack of
clear notice has, therefore, prompted regulators to suggest heightened
disclosures such as the Model GLB Privacy Notice. See In Brief- Legal News, 78
U.S.L.W. 2303, 2303-04 (2009) (summarizing the final rule posted at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34-61003.pdf, which provides a new safe
harbor for notifying consumers of how their information is used in compliance
with Gramm-Leach-Biley Act).
138. Imagine how long the lines would be at common consumer haunts like
Target, Wal-Mart, Best Buy, and the like.
139. It is unclear whether the respondents distinguished broad "terms"
"discussed" at the store from more specific "terms" provided in a paper of some
sort.
140. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix D Section 2, Question 1 (backup on
file with author).
141. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix E Section 2, Question 1 (backup on
file with author) (taking into account the 39 from the store and 12 from the
Internet sample who all reported never seeing terms out of the 291 total who
had purchased an electronic item).
142. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix F Section 2, Question 1c (backup on
file with author).
143. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix G Section 2, Question 1d (backup on
file with author).
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important before buying the item.'"
Nonetheless, survey respondents reported greater attention to
contract terms when signing up for their last credit card. Of the
respondents who had signed up for a credit card, 73.1% reported
that they signed a contract received in the mail or at an institution,
or indicated acceptance to terms on the Internet, before getting their
last card."' In addition, 73% of the 244 respondents who stated that
they received contract terms at some point in getting a credit card
reported reading those terms ex ante or ex post.146  Of the 177
respondents who read credit card terms, 70.6% indicated that they
read the terms before they got their credit cards, and 75% of these
120 respondents considered some of the read terms important in
their decision-making process.14
Although these responses indicate some attention to credit card
terms, this attention is not that significant when viewed in proper
perspective. In total, only 90 of the 264 survey respondents who
recalled signing up for a credit card indicated that they read credit
card terms and found them important.'" In addition, although the
survey asked explicitly about form terms, it is unclear whether
respondents interpreted "terms" to include the fine print usually
contained in "bill stuffers" or Internet links."9 Furthermore, 73.9%
of respondents who reported reading contract terms ex post or ex
ante indicated that none of the terms were important when they had
a problem with the card.150 This comports with focus group
participants' noted preferences for settling purchasing problems
through discussions with company representatives, rather than
more formalized processes. 15
The survey results overall nonetheless support other study
findings that consumers may be more inclined to receive and read
terms before agreeing to what they view as more significant
contracts, assuming they view credit card agreements as more
significant than electronic product purchase terms. In addition,
144. Consumer Survey, infra Appendices F & G Section 2, Questions 1c & d
(backup on file with author). Terms these individuals stated as important
included warranty, return policy, service, and interest/payment terms.
145. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix H Section 2, Question 2 (a)-(h)
(backup on file with author).
146. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix I Section 2, Question 2b (backup on
file with author).
147. Consumer Survey, infra Appendices J & K Section 2, Questions 2c & d
(backup on file with author).
148. Consumer Survey, infra Appendices J & K Section 2, Questions 2c & d
(backup on file with author).
149. Consumers in the focus group discussions I held in Denver reported
that they regularly throw out "bill stuffers" with terms companies add to
consumer contracts. See Consumer Focus Group Notes, supra note 116.
150. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix L Section 2, Questions 2e (backup on
file with author).
151. See Consumer Focus Group Notes, supra note 116.
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consumers may deem it more worthwhile to compare credit card
terms due to wider variation and options for those with adequate
credit scores than is typically available with respect to pre-packaged
fine print accompanying electronic item purchases. Furthermore,
credit card terms affect consumers' immediate and ongoing credit
costs and relationships, whereas electronic item terms usually do
not matter unless and until there is a problem with the purchase.
At the same time, survey findings indicated that most
consumers are aware of contract terms' importance when asked
about their purchases generally. 77.1% of the survey respondents
reported that they generally believe contract terms are "very
important" or "somewhat important" in helping them make
purchasing choices.152 In addition, 39% of respondents stated that
they "always read contract terms" at some point ex ante or ex post
with respect to their purchases generally.1 3  Respondents also
ranked terms "very important" as follows: price (83.2%), warranties
(77.9%), fees and penalties (71.9%), credit payment (74.7%), returns
(66.6%), and cancelling services (67.7%).154
As noted above, these responses should be viewed in light of
individuals' propensity to overstate their competence or socially
desirable behavior."' Respondents also may be overly optimistic
with respect to their general practices and aspirations, and seek to
avoid discomfort or dissonance from acknowledging that their beliefs
and behaviors conflict. Individuals may generally believe that
contract terms are important and hope that they would read them,
but fail to actually read or consider terms in the midst of particular
purchases. Therefore, the percentages of those who truly read their
contracts is likely lower than the results indicated. This also helps
explain why fairly low percentages of respondents said that they
read terms when making their recent purchases, despite the high
percentages indicating general belief that purchase terms are
important.
152. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix M Section 2, Question 3 (backup on
file with author).
153. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix N Section 2, Question 4 (backup on
file with author) (also indicating they were most likely to read contracts as
follows: 20.7% Internet; 19.3% mail; and 14.1% store; while 6.9% stated they
never read contracts).
154. Consumer Survey, infra Appendix 0 Section 2, Question 7. The
question asked: "Think generally about the times when you have looked at
contract terms at any point with respect to your purchases of products or
services. Were any of the terms important to you? Indicate how you generally
view the importance of the following types of terms." Consumer Survey, infra
Appendix 0 Section 2, Question 7. With respect to other terms, respondents
chose "very important" as follows: arbitration (39%), disclaimers/waivers of
liability (48.4%), and freebies and incentives (27.1%).
155. See van de Mortel, supra note 132, at 41 (discussing socially desirable
behavior and propensity to report competent or other socially desirable
behavior).
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CONCLUSION
Pizza-box post-purchase contracts have become the norm in
consumer purchases with the blessing of formalistic contract rules,
efficiency-focused theory, and law-and-economic models that assume
a sufficient number of consumers read and negotiate contracts to
adequately police their fairness. Meanwhile, critics of these
contracts advance strict consumer protection legislation based on
popular stories of corporate abuse and behavioral predictions
regarding consumers' cognitive biases, bounded rationality, and lack
of interest and understanding with respect to their contracts.
Empirical research helps bridge this divide to explore beyond
assumptions and predictions to reveal the true complexities of
consumer contracting culture. It indicates that consumers' negative
perceptions, feelings of helplessness, and lack of time in making
purchases may prevent them from reading or negotiating contracts
in sufficient numbers to police contract fairness. However, the data
also indicates that consumers are rational to the extent they read
contracts that involve greater choice of terms, more relational
contexts, or larger costs and concerns. Furthermore, one study
suggests that companies make their e-contracts more accessible pre-
purchase when the contracts contain pro-seller terms that may be
vulnerable to judicial scrutiny. Nonetheless, the data is limited and
results are mixed. Broader and deeper research is, therefore, vital




APPENDICES: SURVEY RESULTS RELATED TO POST-PURCHASE
CONTRACTING*
APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Ae
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
18-24 yrs old 19 6.2 6.2 6.2
25-29 yrs old 16 5.2 5.2 11.4
30-39 yrs old 40 13.1 13.1 24.5
40-49 yrs old 73 23.9 23.9 48.4
50-59 yrs old 81 26.5 26.5 74.8
60-69 yrs old 54 17.6 17.6 92.5
70 yrs or over 23 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Household Income
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid:
less than $20,000 43 14.1 17.1 17.1
$20,000-$29,999 33 10.8 13.1 30.3
$30,000-$39,999 43 14.1 17.1 47.4
$40,000-$49,999 32 10.5 12.7 60.2
$50,000-$59,999 22 7.2 8.8 68.9
$60,000-$74,999 26 8.5 10.4 79.3
$75,000-$99,999 24 7.8 9.6 88.8
$100,000-$149,999 23 7.5 9.2 98.0
$150,00+ 5 1.6 2.0 100.0
Total 251 82.0 100.0
Missing System 55 18.0
Total 306 100.0 1 1
* I thank Jeffrey Boman for his assistance with data analysis.
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Marital Status
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Single, never married 58 19.0 19.0 19.0
Carried 150 49.0 49.0 68.0
Separated/divorced
/widowed 75 24.5 24.5 92.5
Domestic partnership 23 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
E loyment Status
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Full-time 129 42.2 42.2 42.2
Part-time 49 16.0 16.0 58.2
Not employed 128 41.8 41.8 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Education Level
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Some high school 5 1.6 1.6 1.6
High school grad 34 11.1 11.1 12.7
Some college 135 44.1 44.1 56.9
College degree 78 25.5 25.5 82.4
Some postgrad 17 5.6 5.6 87.9
Master's degree 27 8.8 8.8 96.7
PhD/law/prof degree 10 3.3 3.3 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0 1
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Re pondent Occupat on
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Exec/upper mgmt 12 3.9 4.5 4.5
IT/MIS professional 11 3.6 4.1 8.6
Doctor/surgeon 2 0.7 0.7 9.4
Educator 11 3.6 4.1 13.5
Homemaker 33 10.8 12.4 25.8
Student 13 4.2 4.9 30.7
None of the above 168 54.9 62.9 93.6
Small business
owner 17 5.6 6.4 100.0
Total 267 87.3 100.0
Missing System 39 12.7
Total 306 100.0
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Racial/Ethnic Identificat ion
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Unspecified 45 14.7 14.7 14.7
Other 6 2.0 2.0 16.7
Hispanic 6 2.0 2.0 18.6
Multi: hispanic/other 2 0.7 0.7 19.3
Pacific islander 2 0.7 0.7 19.9
Indian 2 0.7 0.7 20.6
Multi: hispanic indian 1 0.3 .3 20.9
Asian 3 1.0 1.0 21.9
Black 2 0.7 0.7 22.5
White 228 74.5 74.5 97.1
Multi: white/other 1 0.3 0.3 97.4
Multi: white/hispanic 4 1.3 1.3 98.7
Multi:
white/pacific/hispanic 1 0.3 0.3 99.0
Multi: white/indian 2 0.7 0.7 99.7
Multi:
white/indian/hispanic 1 0.3 0.3 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Gender
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Male 103 33.7 33.7 33.7
Female 203 66.3 66.3 100.0




Section 2, Question 1: Think about when you last bought an
electronic entertainment item such as a television, DVD player, VCR,
iPod, stereo, or stereo equipment. Did you purchase this item at a
store, on the Internet, or through other means?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
In store 249 81.4 81.4 81.4
Over Internet 42 13.7 13.7 95.1
Other 3 1.0 1.0 96.1
Never purchased
this type of item 12 3.9 3.9 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
APPENDIX C
Section 2, Question 1 Store(a)-(f): If you purchased the item at
the store, which of the following choices describe what you recall
about any purchase or contract terms you noticed at any point before
or after the purchase? Check all that apply (you may find more than
one applies because terms covering one purchase may appear at
various times and in various ways).
Sample Valid
Frequency Size Percent
Terms were provided before I
purchased 75 249 30.1
Terms were in box/packaging 77 249 30.9
Terms were on bill or invoice 48 249 19.3
Terms were explained to me
by a sales person 94 249 37.8
I did not notice any terms at
any point 39 249 15.7
Other 2 249 0.8
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APPENDIX D
Section 2, Question 1 Internet(a)-(h): If you purchased the item
on the Internet, which of the following choices describe what you
recall about any purchase or contract terms you noticed at any point
before or after the purchase? Check all that apply (you may find only
one that applies, or you may find more than one applies because




Terms on screen; had to indicate
acceptance 10 42 23.8
Terms provided through link;
had to indicate acceptance 4 42 9.5
Terms on screen; did not have to
indicate acceptance 6 42 14.3
Terms provided through link;
did not have to indicate
acceptance 4 42 9.5
Terms in the box or packaging 9 42 21.4
Terms on the bill or invoice 4 42 9.5
Did not notice terms at any
point 12 42 28.6
Other 3 42 7.1
APPENDIX E
Section 2, Question 1, Store (e) and Internet (g). 17.5% of the
total sample of store and Internet purchasers reported never seeing
any terms before or after they purchased their items. This represents
the 39 individuals from the store purchasers that never noticed any
terms and the 12 individuals from the Internet purchasers that never
noticed any terms. Therefore, 51 individuals out of our sample of
291 that reported buying an electronic item did not notice any terms
at any point before or after purchase.
Sample Valid
Frequency Size Percent
Did not notice any terms (Store) 39 249 15.7
Did not notice any terms
(Internet) 12 42 28.6
Total that did not notice any




Section 2, Question 1c: Did you read
you bought this item?
the purchase terms before
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
No 169 55.2 58.3 58.3
Yes 121 39.5 41.7 100.0
Total* 290 94.8 100.0
Missing System 16 5.2
Total 306 100.0 1 1 1
APPENDIX G
Section 2, Question 1d: If you answered "yes" to 1c, did you
consider any of these terms important in deciding whether to
complete the purchase of the item?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
No 62 20.3 52.1 52.1
Yes 57 18.6 47.9 100.0
Total* 119 38.9 100.0
Missing System 187 61.1
Total 306 100.0
** Total is out of 290 and not 291 because one individual failed to move on
and answer this question.
*** This is out of 119 individuals. Above, 121 individuals said yes to 1c and
should have answered this question. However, two individuals failed to move
on and answer this question.
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APPENDIX H
Section 2, Question 2(a)-(h): Regardless of how you got the card,
please indicate which of the following choices describe what you
recall about any contract terms with respect to the credit card. Check
all that apply (you may find only one that applies, or you may find
more than one applies because again, terms may appear at various
times and in various ways).
Sample Valid
Frequency Size Percent
Had to sign contract in mail
before receiving card 76 264 28.8
Had to sign contract at bank
before receiving card 32 264 12.1
Had to agree to terms on
computer screen before
receiving card 61 264 23.1
Had to agree to terms that could
be accessed through link 24 264 9.1
Terms on computer screen; did
not have to indicate
acceptance 11 264 4.2
Terms accessible through link;
did not have to indicate
acceptance 13 264 4.9
Terms were sent in mail/email
after card received 83 264 31.4
Did not notice any terms at any
point 20 264 7.6
APPENDIX I
Section 2, Question 2b: If participants had received contract
terms at some point in the process of getting a card, participants were
asked if they read those terms BEFORE or AFTER getting the card?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
No 66 21.6 27.0 27.0
Yes 178 58.1 73.0 100.0
Total 244 79.7 100.0
Missing System 62 20.3




Section 2, Question 2c: If you answered yes to 2b, when did you
first read the terms?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Before got card 125 40.8 70.6 70.6
After got card 52 17.0 29.4 100.0
Total 177 57.8 100.0
Missing System 129 42.2
Total 306 100.0 1
APPENDIX K
Section 2, Question 2d: If you read the terms before you got the
card, what, if any, terms did you consider important in deciding you
wanted the card?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
No terms 30 9.8 25.0 25.0
Listed terms 90 29.4 75.0 100.0
Total 120 39.2 100.0
Missing System 186 60.8
Total 306 100.0
APPENDIX L
Section 2, Question 2e: If you read the terms either again or for
the first time after you had a question or problem with the card,
what, if any, terms were important regarding your question or
problem with the card?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
No terms 122 39.9 73.9 73.9
Listed terms 43 14.1 26.1 100.0
Total 165 53.9 100.0
Missing System 141 46.1
Total 306 100.0 1
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APPENDIX M
Section 2, Question 3: Now consider your purchases generally,
and various terms you have noticed when buying products and
services. How important were these terms to you in helping you make
purchasing choices?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Very important 96 31.4 31.5 31.5
Somewhat important 139 45.4 45.6 77.0
Minor importance 52 17.0 17.0 94.1
Not important 18 5.9 5.9 100.0
Total*** 305 99.7 100.0
Missing System 1 0.3
Total 306 100.0
APPENDIX N
Section 2, Question 4: Are you more likely to read purchase terms
when you receive them over the Internet, through the mail, or at a
store?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Internet 63 20.6 20.7 20.7
Mail 59 19.3 19.3 40.0
Store 43 14.1 14.1 54.1
Never read 21 6.9 6.9 61.0
Always read 119 38.9 39.0 100.0
Total*** 305 99.7 100.0
Missing System 1 0.3
Total 306 100.0 1 1
**** Total is out of 305 because one participant failed to answer this section
of survey.





Section 2, Question 7: Think generally about the times when you
have looked at contract terms at any point with respect to your
purchases of products or services. Were any of the terms important to




Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Very important 252 82.4 83.2 83.2
Somewhat important 50 16.3 16.5 99.7
Minor importance 1 0.3 0.3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0
Missing System 3 1
Total 306 100.0 1
Warranties
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Very important 236 77.1 77.9 77.9
Somewhat important 61 19.9 20.1 98.0
Minor importance 5 1.6 1.7 99.7
Not important 1 0.3 0.3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0
Missing System 3 1.0
Total 306 100.0 1 1
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Fees and Penalties
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Very important 218 71.2 71.9 71.9
Somewhat important 72 23.5 23.8 95.7
Minor importance 13 4.2 4.3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0
Missing System 3 1
Total 306 100.0
Interest Rate for Credit Payment
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Very important 227 74.2 74.7 74.7
Somewhat important 48 15.7 15.8 90.5
Minor importance 15 4.9 4.9 95.4
Not important 14 4.6 4.6 100.0
Total 304 99.3 100.0
Missing System 2 0.7
Total 306 100.0 1 1
Terms for Return
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Very important 201 65.7 66.6 66.6
Somewhat important 85 27.8 28.1 94.7
Minor importance 13 4.2 4.3 99.0
Not important 3 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 302 98.7 100.0
Missing System 4 1.3
Total 306 100.0 1 1
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Terms for Cancel ling Services
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Very important 205 67.0 67.7 67.7
Somewhat important 84 27.5 27.7 95.4
Minor importance 13 4.2 4.3 99.7
Not important 1 0.3 0.3 100.0
Total 303 99.0 100.0
Missing System 3 1.0
Total 306 100.0

